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Abstract
This paper examines the underlying drivers of MLB franchise value. Using panel data for
MLB teams from 2000-2010, I find that a team’s ballpark and metro-area market are
significant determinants, yet revenues truly drive value. Further, I find that incremental
increases in winning percentage by a particular team has an insignificant effect on total
revenues and has no marginal impact on the value of the team, particularly if the team
recognizes consistent revenue streams every year. Finally, I show that the modern
sabermetric approach to player management negatively impacts firm value, suggesting
that although small market teams have been successful using this strategy to increase
their on-field performance, its use in isolation is not financially beneficial to the
organization in the long run.

v

I.

INTRODUCTION
Inaccessible financial data for Major League Baseball teams has long prevented

the complete and direct valuation of a franchise, yet recent studies, e.g. Humphreys and
Mondello (2008), Miller (2007), Vine (2004) and Fort (2006), have examined
professional sports teams’ value and some of its determinants. More and more, teams are
looked at as valuable operating organizations and in recent years the sales prices of teams
have seen fantastic growth. The Chicago Cubs, an iconic franchise, albeit one that has not
won a World Series in over 100 years, sold for $845 million to TD Ameritrade founder
Joe Rickets and family in 2009.1 In the summer of 2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers’
owner Frank McCourt brought significant attention to the franchise and sparked debate
over the value and ideal ownership of the team. With the sale of the Dodgers announced
in November, 2011 some are speculating that the franchise could fetch as much as or
possibly exceed $1 billion.
There are many questions surrounding the financial status of MLB teams. In 2001
MLB commissioner Bud Selig reported that 19 MLB teams were operating at a loss for
that season for an amount exceeding $350 million collectively, suggesting that baseball is
a non-profitable industry (Fort 2006). Nevertheless, if a franchise seeks to fetch as much
as $1 billion in the open market, there must be strong underlying drivers of value.
Evidence does suggest that there is a significant premium attached to the sale price of an
MLB franchise (Vine 2007); yet it still remains a question as to what truly determines the
underlying value upon which the premium is attached. Furthermore, there appears to be
1

Associated Press. (2009) Cubs Sale Unanimously Approved.
http://sports.espn.go.com/chicago/mlb/news/story?id=4537317, Retrieved, 11/10/11.
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juxtaposition between teams’ financial success and their on-field success. Teams such as
the Tampa Bay Rays have been consistent contenders in recent years, reaching a World
Series in 2008, yet struggle to fill their stadium to half capacity and are considered one of
the least valuable franchises, whereas the Chicago Cubs, currently holding the longest
World Series drought in the league and perennially in the bottom of their division, sell
out virtually every game and are among the most valuable in the league.
A preliminary examination Forbes Magazine’s most recent estimates for MLB
team values confirms many common expectations, the large market franchises, New
York, Boston, Chicago and Los Angeles, are among the highest valued. However, it is
unclear what determines the difference in value between, in the most recent ranking, the
Cincinnati Reds (ranked 23rd) and the Baltimore Orioles (ranked 18th); both teams have
enjoyed limited success in recent years (Cincinnati has improved recently and Baltimore
has fallen), play in mid-sized markets, have strong history and play in modern ballparks.
This paper will decompose the value of teams to begin to answer this question.

II.

SURVEY OF LITERATURE
Overall, economic literature concerning the value of professional sports franchises

is limited; however, there has been a recent increase in published work on the topic. The
large reason for the limited amount of studies is most likely due to the inability to access
financial statements and perform valuation methods such as discounted cash flow
analysis. Studies have almost exclusively used one proxy for firm value in their models,
team sales prices.

2

Sales Prices vs. Forbes’ Published Estimates
Vine (2004) examined the relationship between Forbes’ estimates and team sales
prices to determine whether or not professional sports franchises sold at a discount or at a
premium. The study found that franchises have sold at an average 27% premium relative
to their Forbes estimated value.

Vine suggested this premium to be caused by an

ownership “ego factor,” derived from the greater utility gained from ownership of
professional sports franchise compared to ownership of other operating organizations. In
addition, Vine also showed that revenue was statistically significant and thus influential
in determining the sale price of a franchise.
I look to expand upon this study by using the Forbes data for the last decade to
take a more modern look at team value, particularly given Vine’s determination of the
difference between the two proxies for firm value. One great limitation of using sales
price data is that the time period that must be examined to gather enough observations
spans back almost fifty years. The problem with this is that the game has greatly changed
over this period. Sales prices in the 1970s and 1980s would not reflect the contributions
of cable television rights, online and modern media advertising and many of the
additional aspects that are considered in the modern transaction. I plan on examining the
last decade (2000-2010) in an effort to examine what determines the value of a franchise
today.
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Effect of Team’s Location and Stadium
Alexander and Kern (2004) examined the effect of team nomenclature, metro-area
location and new stadiums on franchise value in all professional sports. The consensus of
this study was that market size and new facilities positively influence a team’s value,
measured from sales prices. The data shows that building a new stadium increases an
MLB team’s value by an average of $17 million. Alexander and Kern’s results also
indicated a positive correlation between market size and value. Miller (2007) expanded
upon this work, analyzing MLB panel data from 1990 to 2002, using Forbes’ estimates,
to further examine the impact of new stadiums on franchise value, particularly to see if
the form of funding of the stadium, private or public, had an impact on value. Miller
found that teams playing in new stadiums observed an increase in firm value, consistent
with Alexander and Kern’s findings, but also showed that teams playing in privately
owned stadiums had higher franchise values, although this difference was insignificant
relative to the private costs of construction.
Humphreys and Mondello (2008), through a hedonic price model, also analyzed
characteristics of franchises in all four major sports that they hypothesized would affect
sales prices. Their results showed that local market size, franchise age, the number of
competing professional teams in the market and the ownership of the stadium all have
significant hedonic prices but the team’s on-field success and facility age do not.
I seek to not only determine whether or not the factors examined by Alexander
and Kern, Miller and Humphreys and Mondello are significant to value in the last decade,
but also quantify their relative contribution to value, and ultimately control for them.
Although the factors examined in these studies may positively affect value, they are
4

virtually fixed characteristics. It is not plausible to change metro-area location and/or
build a new stadium on a regular basis to create value. Thus, I will empirically test
whether value is driven purely by regional identity and facilities or by other operational
variables as well.

Growth of Team Values
Fort (2006) examined the growth of team sales prices and found the average
growth rate to be twice the typical growth rate of 3% for the economy as a whole. Fort
examined data over the entire modern baseball era, and showed the changes in the growth
of sale prices for the last five decades.

Tax Shields and Incentives
Fort (2006) also details why operating income is a misleading metric in
examining MLB franchise values.

The reason for this stems from the unique tax

opportunities presented to franchises and their ability to shift revenue to and from
different units of the team. Teams often take advantage of a large tax shelter produced by
the “roster depreciation allowance” (RDA). Spawned by White Sox owner Bill Veeck in
1959, the current form of the RDA allowed by the IRS enables owners to depreciate
100% of the team’s purchase price over a 15 year period. Thus, in one scenario, if a team
is purchased for $225 million and depreciated for the allowable 15 years, there would be
a yearly expense of $17 million (RDA). This means that even if the team has an
operating profit of $5 million every year, once the RDA is subtracted, the team will
report a loss and the $5 million of previously taxable income is now tax free. Not only
5

does this suggest that often profitable teams report losses and but that they have the
financial incentive to do so, even more so with the current league revenue sharing. As
former Toronto Blue Jay’s President and COO Paul Beeston stated “anyone who quotes
profits of a baseball club is missing the point. Under generally accepted accounting
principles, I can turn $4 million profits into a $2 million loss and I can get every national
accounting firm to agree with me.”2 Vine (2004) maintains a similar claim, that operating
profits and losses are not the ideal indication of a team’s value. Many different expenses
will skew profits on a short term basis, but have little to no, if not the opposite, effect on
future profitability and overall value. Thus, I plan to focus on the various sources of
revenue independent of expenses incurred.

III.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA
I compiled a panel of estimated team values and additional operating and

performance statistics for all 30 MLB teams for the last decade (2000-2010) and included
data specific to each team’s ballpark, metro-area population and on-field performance for
the period. This section describes each variable examined, discusses their sources and
acknowledges the shortcomings of the data. For a summary of all variables: See Data
Appendix.

2

Fort (2006), pg 12.
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Forbes Magazine Estimates
Each year Forbes publishes its Business of Baseball segment in which it estimates
the value of each MLB franchise and their operating financials independently, without
consulting any team executives.

3

Forbes estimates value based on the team’s current

stadium deal without deductions for debt, beyond stadium debt. Their total revenue
estimates are net of stadium revenues used for debt payment and represent the revenue
collected from all sources including: stadium, concessions, gate receipts, television and
sponsorships. Forbes also calculates a wins-to-player-cost ratio which compares the
number of wins per player payroll dollar to the rest of the league. Playoff wins count for
twice as much as regular season wins. For example if a team’s ratio is 130 this means
that the team won 30% more games per dollar of payroll compared to the league average.
With such a large focus on the effect of “Moneyball” player management (named after
Michael Lewis’ 2003 book) using Sabermetric analysis to determine undervalued and
thus cheaper payroll players, this stat attempts to quantify the degree to which
management has mastered this approach, maximizing their payroll dollars to achieve onfield success. For my analysis I adjusted Forbes’ wins-to-player-cost to reflect the
percentage above or below the average wins per payroll dollar by subtracting 100 from
each data point; this new variable is hereafter called adjwpc.
I chose to use the Forbes data as my proxy for firm value because it was available
every year for the last decade and although biases are no doubt present, using this data
eliminates the potential premiums and synergies accounted for in a sales price. Indeed,
since the goal of this study was to examine the value drivers of teams, I chose a proxy for
3

The data was downloaded from Forbes.com and http://www.rodneyfort.com/SportsData
MLB/MLBData.html, where older data was archived. Retrieved October 1, 2011.
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value that presumably had no premium, rather than use sales prices which in many
instances could reflect an inflation value due to, as Vine suggests, “an ego effect.”
Further, when comparing Forbes’ estimates against the financial statements of several
teams leaked to deadspin.com, Forbes appeared to be quite accurate, giving further
substantiation for my use of their estimates in this study. Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2
compare the Forbes estimates of value and revenues against the ten leaked financials.
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EXHIBIT 1: Comparision of Franchise Value
Organization
(Year)
Rangers (2008)
Brewers (2001)
Brewers (2002)
Brewers (2003)
Rays (2007)
Rays (2008)
Mariners (2007)
Mariners (2008)
Pirates (2007)
Pirates (2008)
Average

Forbes
Estimate

Team Reported Value

176,000,000
108,260,000
98,000,000
102,000,000
138,000,000
160,000,000
194,000,000
189,000,000
144,000,000
145,000,000
145,426,000

152,117,917
110,000,000
104,400,000
115,900,000
133,777,450
160,961,576
223,820,000
216,200,000
138,636,326
145,993,437
150,180,671

Forbes Premium
13.6%
-1.6%
-6.5%
-13.6%
3.1%
-0.6%
-15.4%
-14.4%
3.7%
-0.7%
3.7%

Exhibit 2: Revenue Comparison
Pirates (2008)
Pirates (2007)
Mariners (2008)
Mariners (2007)
Rays (2008)
Rays (2007)

Team Reported Value

Brewers (2003)

Forbes Estimate

Brewers (2002)
Brewers (2001)
Rangers (2008)
0

100

200
Dollars in Millions

This graph compares Forbes’ estimates of revenues against teams’ audited financial statements
for a small sample of organizations whose financials were leaked on deadspin.com in 2010.
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Team Marketing Report Data
In order to reflect the ticketing and concessions functions of each franchise I
collected data from Team Marketing Report, a sports marketing agency. The Fan Cost
Index (hereafter referred to as “FCI”) reflects the cost to a family of four to attend a game
and includes 4 tickets, 4 soft drinks, 2 small beers, 4 hot dogs, 2 programs, parking and 2
adult sized hats.4

Census Data
To quantify the size of the market that each team plays in, I compiled the metroarea population of each team’s market for each season examined. Using US Census data
for all major metro-area populations from the 2000 census and the 2010 census, I
linearized the published growth rate of each individual metro-area from 2000 to 2010 to
calculate the metro-area population for each year for each team.5

Facilities Data
I calculated ballpark age (number of seasons that the park has hosted) and created
dummy variables and interacted them with age for the three historic ballparks in the data
set, Wrigley Field, Fenway Park and the old Yankee Stadium (in use for 9 of the 11
seasons examined), called “Wrigley” “Fenway” and “Yankeestad,” to account for their
unique effect on value.

Ballparks, when old enough, become a source of attraction for

fans, purely for their history and classic feel. Indeed, many more fans attend Boston Red

4
5

This data was downloaded from teammarketing.com on October 1, 2011.
This data was downloaded from http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/ on October 10, 2011.
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Sox and Chicago Cubs games every year, often times traveling great distances, than
ordinarily would if it were not for the old ballparks that the teams play in. Each of these
three parks were over 80 years old and there was a clear gap between these three venues
and the rest of the MLB parks; at the end of the 2010 season the oldest ballpark aside
from Wrigley Field and Fenway Park was Dodger Stadium at 49 years old.

Additional Data
I also generated a team fixed effect variable, called ID, that attempts to capture
the unique aspects of each franchise that are present every single year, such as their
history and fan base to enable analysis on an individual franchise level. Additionally, I
gathered franchise total salary, win totals and attendance figures for each of the eleven
seasons examined6.

Shortcomings of the Data
There are multiple shortcomings to this data panel. On the most basic level, the
Forbes statistics are all estimates, not audited financial numbers. However, any inherent
biases are systematically present for each of the 30 teams over the 11 season time period
examined. Additionally, certain statistics were not compiled for every year examined;
Forbes did not start publishing wins-to-player-cost ratio until 2002.

6

This data was downloaded from www.baseballreference.com on October 1, 2011.
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IV.

DATA SUMMARY

Exhibit 3: Summary Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Value ($M)

330

359.47

196.14

89

1600

Revenues ($M)

330

156.81

52.28

53.9

441

Ballpark Age (Years)

330

23.93

24.99

1

99

Metro-area Population (Millions)

330

5.50

4.51

0.39

18.89

Attendance (Millions)

330

2.45

0.72

0.64

4.29

Wins

330

80.99

11.65

43

116

FCI ($)

330

165.55

43.86

76.77

410.88

Total Team Salary ($M)

330

75.71

33.06

14.67

208.31

Adjusted Wins-to-Player Cost

270

-0.08

31.21

-57

155

Exhibit 3 displays summary statistics; all operating figures and team values are
reflected in millions.

The average team value is approximately $360 million with

revenues of, on average, $156 million each year. As this chart reflects, there are large
ranges of both value and revenue across the league, which leads the way for examination
of the determinants of these differences; the smallest value figure over the decade was
$89 million; whereas the largest was $1.6 billion.
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V.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
I use this data in linear regressions of Forbes’ yearly estimates of franchise value

and revenue on the various statistics I compiled. I regress data points in natural logs to
ease the interpretation of the results, enabling analysis in terms of percentage changes of
each variable. In each regression model I include ballpark controls, wrigley, fenway and
yankeestad and year fixed effects. Additionally, I include team fixed effects (ID) in four
of the eight models. The general specification used is as follows:
Yit =α + β1x1it+ β2x2it + … βnxnit + βwrigley+ βfenway + βyankeestad + Σβyeart
[+ΣβIDi ]+ uit

X1 through Xn are the specific financial or descriptive variables being examined
and i indexes the franchise and t indexes the year.
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Exhibit 4: Regression Results
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

VARIABLES

Lvalue

Lvalue

Lrev

Lrev

Lvalue

Lvalue

Latten

Lvalue

Blpkage

-0.007***

-0.000

-.005***

-0.002***

-0.000

-0.002**

-0.001

-0.002**

(-4.86)

(-0.03)

(-5.96)

(-3.99)

(-0.20)

(-2.09)

(-0.77)

(-1.96)

0.261***

-0.034

0.023

0.082***

-0.043

-0.030**

0.062**

0.074***

(8.98)

(-0.93)

(-0.70)

(6.18)

(-0.94)

(-0.76)

(2.13)

(3.72)

Lpop
Lrev
Wins

1.216***

1.17***

(18.17)

(13.02)

-0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

(0.00)

(1.01)

(1.05)

(-0.10)

(0.71)

(0.58)

(0.44)

-0.001***

-0.001*

(-4.57)

(-1.77)

0.270***

0.031

(11.75)

(0.92)

Adjwpc
Lsalary
Latten
FCI
Constant

Observations
R

2

AdjR2

0.455***

0.626***

(11.64)

(16.35)

0.003***

0.004***

0.003***

(5.79)

(7.73)

(8.28)

18.90***

-3.22**

18.72***

13.65***

-3.01*

12.28***

13.98***

9.48***

(287.80)

(-2.56)

(210.96)

(33.75)

(-1.89)

(21.28)

(164.18)

(17.60)

329

329

329

269

269

329

329

329

.617

.955

.925

.875

.914

.948

.343

.856

.600

.948

.913

.867

.910

.936

.307

.851

T-Statistics in parenthesis
*** Significant at 1% level or better
** Significant at 5% level up to but not including the 1% level
* Significant at the 10% level up to but not including the 5% level
Note: Every regression includes controls for year fixed effects as well as the three ballpark controls
Wrigley, Fenway and Yankeestad.
Regressions 2, 3, 5 and 6 include team fixed effects in the model.
For Explanation of Variables See Data Appendix
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Basic Model
Regression 1 reflects the most basic model, regressing the natural log of value on
the variables: ballpark age, natural log of metro-area population and the controls.
Commonly, the two variables examined in this regression, a team’s geographic market
and ballpark, are assumed to pre-determine relative value of franchises across the league,
a notion that certain franchises will never be among the most valuable, no matter how
successful, because they do not play in an ideal location or ballpark. Overall, 60%
percent of the variation in value is explained by this model. Indeed, the perception that
value is largely determined by basic characteristics such as location and ballpark appears
to have statistical rooting. However, the flipside to this is that 40% of the variation in
value is unexplained by the model and thus value can be influenced outside of these
characteristics.

As a result, both of these factors, ballpark and population, will be

controls to examine additional, changeable drivers of value going forward and the
individual statistical effects of these two variables will be interpreted in a subsequent,
more complete model.

Revenues, Winning and “Moneyball”
In Regression 2 I regress the natural log of value on the natural log of total
revenues, the team’s win total and the controls for ballpark, population, year fixed effects
and team fixed effects, to examine the impact of revenues and on-field performance on
team value. This regression includes team fixed effects so as to enable examination of
incremental changes in value of one particular franchise as opposed to comparing the
values of different franchises.
15

The results confirm Vine’s conclusion that revenue is statistically significant in
determining value, showing that a 1% increase in revenue will increase franchise value
by 1.21%, holding all else constant. This comes as no surprise. What is unique about
these results is that winning is not statistically significant in determining value, holding
revenue, ballpark age, market, year and team identity constant.
The first reaction to this is to examine the endogenous relationships embedded in
the model; in most cases it is unrealistic to hold revenue constant and examine the impact
of winning because winning will have an impact on revenues. Successful teams will
presumably draw more fans and thus generate more concession and ticket revenue. To
examine this I regress the log of revenues on wins, ballpark age, log of metro-area
population, the controls, and team fixed effects. Interestingly, winning again is not
statistically significant and has a coefficient of roughly zero, suggesting that incremental
increases in winning might not make a significant impact on revenue streams after all.
Teams have employed different strategies to put a winning team on the field in the
last decade. However the strategy that many small market and low valued franchises
have undertaken to assemble a winning team has been the “Moneyball” strategy; using
sabermetric analysis to find undervalued players and better assess talent. One would
imagine that simply winning is winning and the strategy used to achieve those wins, does
not have an impact on value. Regression 4 seeks to test this by expanding on Regression
3, by adding adjwpc to represent the relative effectiveness of using salary dollars
efficiently (effective use of “Moneyball” principles) and total salary to control for the
different budgets of each franchise. Regression 4 does not have team fixed effects. In
this regression I control for wins and salary so as to determine, for a given winning
16

percentage and salary, how much winning through “Moneyball” impacts value. The
results show that in fact winning through “Moneyball” detracts from value (significant at
1% level) rather than adding to it. An increase of 10 in adjwpc, winning 10% more
games per payroll dollar, actually causes a 1% loss in value. This means that if two
teams, A and B win the same amount of games, and B won 40% more games per payroll
dollar than team A, team B would be worth 4% less than team A.
In Regression 5 I put adjwpc and salary into the Regression 2 model to now
examine the “Moneyball” effect on value holding all else constant. Again adjwpc is
statistically significant with a negative coefficient on team value. I therefore infer that
the “Moneyball” strategy, in isolation, is not financially beneficial for a franchise seeking
to increase its value; rather, “Moneyball” should be complimented by player decisions
that increase revenues and value immediately, i.e. a big name veteran. By concentrating
on winning through finding undervalued players, the team is missing out on the impact
that their player decisions could have on revenues and ultimately value. Many of the
players that are prime “Moneyball” players, although very successful in their roles, do
not draw fans to the game or generate significant souvenir revenues independent of their
performance. Teams should not only buy wins but should also purchase the most high
profile players within their budget that they feel will help their team.
Unfortunately for large proponents of sabermetrics, it appears that teams
constructed through, so called, traditional means as opposed to modern statistics may be
more valuable from an operations perspective. The bottom-line is that fans do not come
to the ballpark to see players get on base; they are still attracted to homeruns.
Furthermore, since the “Moneyball” approach is no longer a secret method, perfected by
17

a select few, the incremental change in a team’s wins-per-player-cost ratio will be harder
to come by, now that everyone is evaluating talent with the same eye.

The new

advantage appears to be discovering not only undervalued performance but also
undervalued revenue generating players to compliment. This ultimately should be the
focus for small market teams, because as previously determined in the basic model, they
have a disadvantage from the start and the data shows that these teams have, for the large
part failed to cover ground in relative valuation in the last decade. Unfortunately the
scope of this study limits quantifying the impact of a star (a presumably revenue
generating) player on team value. This is something that should be examined in more
detail in future studies to ultimately determine whether there is an effect like the one
commonly seen in the film industry whereby stars earn, on average, their marginal
contribution to value or in fact they generate a net creation of value for their teams. If
there proves to be a way to identify a player that, when placed on a roster, creates a net
value increase this would be useful to teams seeking to increase their overall value.
All this withstanding however, if teams are able to keep revenues constant, as
shown in Regression 5, incremental winning is not at all important in value creation.
This helps to explain why franchises such as the Chicago Cubs are so valuable even
though they consistently finish in the bottom of their division and have not won a World
Series in over 100 years. Even after controlling for the effect of their ballpark, history
and market, winning still does not matter if revenues are constant; Chicago sells out
virtually every game, giving them a consistent flow of revenue. Hence, teams must find a
way to increase revenues independent of their on-field performance if they seek to
maximize value.
18

Attendance and Pricing
As the previous section illustrated, revenues are key for any franchise’s value; this
section breaks down the effect of different revenue contributors. Regression 6 expands
upon Regression 2 by removing total revenue and adding the log of attendance and FCI.
The results confirm that broad concession (including tickets) pricing and attendance are
statistically significant in determining value. An increase of 100 thousand fans per year,
roughly 617 fans per game, will increase value by 4.5% or $16.2 million. Thus, a team
can increase its value significantly by simply boosting its attendance. However, data
indicates that a 10% increase in attendance is not easily achieved; for the 11 seasons
examined for all 30 teams (not counting the attendance increase from moving the Expos
from Montreal to Washington DC) there were only 55 instances of attendance growth
over 10% out of 329 observations. Further, 7 of these 55 instances of above 10% growth
in attendance can be attributed to opening of a new stadium that year. No doubt teams are
trying to increase attendance as much as they can every year, thus such an increase is
clearly difficult to realize.
Regression 6 also shows, as expected, that holding attendance constant, if a team
raises total concession prices value will increase; yet, in reality demand is rarely price
inelastic enough to withstand large price hikes. Thus, I regressed the natural log of
attendance on FCI, wins, ballpark age, natural log of population, controls and team fixed
effects in Regression 7.
The regression shows an unrealistic result, namely that the coefficient between
FCI and log of attendance is positive and significant at all levels.

This ultimately

suggests that baseball tickets have an upward sloping demand curve, which is not the
19

case. Again, like with winning and revenues, there are issues of endogenous effects, as
the pricing and attendance variables each lack clear independent effects. Often high
attendance and high prices are observed together. An issue with this OLS regression is
that it ignores such effects. The model does not capture the fact that teams with a greater
metro-area population, history and median income (not examined in the model) observe
the highest attendance levels and charge higher prices, which is reflected in the positive
coefficient.
Overall 37% of the variation in attendance is explained by pricing, winning,
ballpark, team fixed effects and metro-area population. Currently teams set ticket prices
before the season and do not alter them during the season. However recent trends,
specifically in the third party ticketing service industry (e.g. Ticketmaster), have begun to
suggest the benefit of more dynamic pricing, adapting to attendance and capturing more
producer surplus from ticketing operations. As essential monopolists these teams are
beginning to maximize profit through price discrimination and adaptive pricing.
Therefore, as teams make greater use of their economic advantages in the future, this is
an area that will need to be expanded upon.

Television and Media
Comparing the results from Regression 6 to those from Regression 2, the amount
of variation in value explained by the model decreased by 1.2%; recall that the difference
between Regression 6 and Regression 2 is that Regression 6 examines attendance driven
revenues and Regression 2 examines total revenues. The clear omitted variable that was
captured in total revenues that is not captured in attendance driven revenues, television
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and advertising revenues, must therefore have an influence on value. Television provides
a large steady source of revenues for teams and ultimately enables them to earn money
irrespective of their on-field performance.

Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain

television revenue or ratings data to attempt to quantify this impact and any future work
on this topic should examine its impact on value, particularly controlling for other
variables to show the importance of things such as a regional sports network contract.
Nevertheless, in my examination of MLB TV contracts it appears that TV revenues’
greatly contribute to team value.

There has been a large shift in recent years towards

cable network deals and away from local broadcast TV. In 2009, an average of 16 games
per team were available on free TV, the lowest in the sport’s history (Settimi 2009). The
majority of teams have moved to exclusive regional sports networks or started their own.
It is no surprise that of the 10 largest team television contracts, 5 of them are among the
top 9 most valuable franchises.

Ballpark and Market
Regression 6 shows that ballpark age is not statistically significant, in line with
Humphreys and Mondello’s findings. These results, coupled with Alexander and Kern’s
previous findings that a new ballpark will increase value by $17 million dollars (4.7% of
the average franchise value in this study) proves that a team’s new ballpark can be
important to the generation of value, but in fact an older facility does not detract from
value as commonly thought. Indeed, as seen in Regression 3, which uses revenues as the
dependent variable, ballpark age is statistically significant but again not with any
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substantial impact; every year a park ages, revenues decrease by .5%. Thus, ballpark age
is not economically important to team value.
In order to examine the value differences between teams’ markets I took
Regression 6 and removed the team fixed effects. The difference between small market
and big market is significant in determining value; the log of population is statistically
significant at the 5% level. The regression shows that a 10% increase in metro-area
population, which is roughly the difference between the metro-area population of Los
Angeles, home of the Angels and the Dodgers, and Milwaukee, home of the Brewers,
increases value by .74% or about $2.7 million dollars for the average franchise.
Interpreted differently, a 1% decrease in population will lower a team’s value by .07%.
The census data used to create this variable showed that certain metro-areas are losing
population yearly, which means that value of franchises in these metro-areas, such as
Detroit, are eroding yearly, although not to any level of alarm or importance.

VI.

CONCLUSION
The statistical significance of a team’s ballpark and metro-area market is a

starting point for understanding MLB team values. It is unrealistic to assume, based on
the results, that a team such as the Cleveland Indians will ever be valued as much as the
New York Yankees, as teams do derive value from their market size and team history.
Yet the key driver of team value appears to be its revenues. If teams are able to ensure
consistent revenues, whether attendance driven or non-attendance driven, winning
becomes marginally insignificant to the team’s value.
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This paper has shown the broad determinants of team value yet ultimately future
maximization of that value proves an even more complex issue. The models in this paper
examine historical team variables and interpret many of them in isolation. Yet in reality,
MLB teams operate in an environment where practically no aspect of the team can be
altered in isolation; there are many endogenous and exogenous factors influencing every
aspect of the team. As briefly discussed, for example, increasing attendance by 10% is
quite difficult. It is safe to assume that teams have firm value in mind and are already
trying to maximize it.
Additionally, extending these results to a discussion of value maximization sparks
the debate over whether such maximization is not only realizable but also good for the
game. Inaccurate estimates of demand its associated relative elasticity prevent teams
from taking aggressive actions such as raising prices dramatically each off-season to
increase revenues and ultimately team value. Teams struggle to determine the thresholds
at which fans’ demand falls in favor of substitute forms of entertainment. Furthermore,
even if demand proves strong enough to withstand price increases, as professional sports
become more and more business and financially focused, they run the risk of still
disconnecting with many different types of fans. The question becomes, whether or not
steps should be taken to maximize revenues to the point where the average fan cannot
attend a game, due to exorbitant prices.
These questions, to some, drive even deeper in regards to the integrity of the game
of baseball. New ballparks add value simply from their construction and help to boost
revenues from luxury seating, increased concessions and numerous other areas. Many
ballparks recently replaced were outdated eye sores that many fans were happy to see go,
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but in other instances classic cathedrals of American Sports were demolished in favor of
facilities with multiple restaurants and club seating.

Although I show that a large

majority of value is derived outside the lines, a fact that no doubt dictates many team’s
operational decisions, the debate still exists whether this area of focus (off the field)
should always be the main focus for teams.
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VII.

DATA APPENDIX

Value: Yearly published estimates of franchise value from Forbes magazine based on the
team’s current stadium deal without deductions for debt, beyond stadium debt.
Revenue: Forbes’ published estimate of total revenue net of stadium revenues used for
debt payment; represents the revenue collected from all sources including: stadium,
concessions, gate receipts, television and sponsorships.
Adjwpc: Forbes’ published wins-to-player cost ratio comparing the number of wins per
player payroll dollar to the rest of the league minus 100. Playoff wins count for twice as
much as regular season wins. A value of 30 means that the team won 30% more games
per dollar of salary compared with the league average.
Pop: The metro-area population for a given franchise calculated using 2000 and 2010
census growth rates and data. Published growth between the two Censuses was linearly
distributed across the years.
Blpkage: The age of a team’s ballpark.
Wins: Total number of wins each team records each season, using only regular season
numbers.
Salary: Team total salary per year.
FCI: Fan Cost Index, an index calculated by Team Marketing Report that reflects the
cost to a family of four to attend a game and includes 4 tickets, 4 soft drinks, 2 small
beers, 4 hot dogs, 2 programs, parking and 2 adult sized hats.
Attendance: Total paid attendance per season
Wrigley: Interactive dummy variable to capture the effect of Wrigley Field
Fenway: Interactive dummy variable to capture the effect of Fenway Park
Yankeestad: Interactive dummy variable to capture the effect of the old Yankee Stadium
Lvalue: The natural logarithm of value
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Lrev: The natural logarithm of revenue
Lsalary: The natural logarithm of salary
Lpop: The natural logarithm of metro-area population
Latten: The natural logarithm of total yearly attendance
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VIII.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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